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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Defendant Google, Inc. (“Google,” “Defendant,” or “the Company”) has 
created a business model that relies upon intercepting, reading, and analyzing the content of 
private email messages.  Specifically, in offering its web-based email service (“Gmail”)1 to 
users, Google elected to forego charging money for the service, instead employing a system 
architecture that scans each email sent to or from a Gmail accountholder, then deriving and 
cataloging the content of that email in order to create data profiles of the communicants for 
purposes of selling to paying customers, and sending to the profiled communicants, targeted 
advertising based upon analysis of these profiles.   
2. In so doing, Google secretly and systematically diverts the transmission of 
email messages to devices—separate from the devices that are instrumental to sending and 
receiving email—that are designed to and do extract the messages’ content.  Google analyzes 
the content of users’ email messages to predict their behavior, and to influence and manipulate 
them in order to gain an economic advantage over them.  As Google’s former CEO Eric 
Schmidt described it: “We know where you are.  We know where you’ve been.  We can more 
or less know what you’re thinking about.”2 
3. Google has not obtained any consent from non-Gmail users to having their 
emails scanned, analyzed, and cataloged indefinitely.  These individuals have never agreed to 
Google’s terms of service and have not at any point or in any fashion agreed to allow Google 
to acquire and indefinitely store the contents of their emails.  Yet, whenever these individuals 
send or receive email messages from a Gmail accountholder, this is precisely what Google 
does. 
4. Google’s practice of intercepting, extracting, reading, and using the private 
email content of individuals who do not have email accounts with Google violates the 
                                                 
1 Google offers several variations of its Gmail product including Gmail for individual users, a 
version for businesses called Google Apps for Work, and a version for educational institutions 
called Google Apps for Education.  Collectively, all Google-based email services will be referred 
to as “Gmail” in this Complaint. 
2 Interview with Eric Schmidt by Maria Bartiromo, CNBC (Dec. 9, 2009), reposted on the 
Huffington Post (Mar. 8, 2010) (available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/07/google-
ceo-on-privacy-if_n_383105.html). 
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California Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Pen. Code §§ 630, et seq. (“CIPA”), and the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (“ECPA”). 
5. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of persons in the State of California, who 
have not established an email account with Google, and who have sent emails to or received 
emails from individuals who have, and for this purpose used, Google email accounts; as well 
as a class of all persons in the United States, who have not established an email account with 
Google, and who sent emails to or received emails from individuals with Google email 
accounts before December 19, 2014 (collectively, “the Classes”). 
6. Plaintiff seeks, on behalf of the proposed Classes, (1) a declaration that 
Google’s conduct violates CIPA; (2) a declaration that Google’s conduct before December 19, 
2014 violated ECPA; (3) injunctive relief in the form of, inter alia, an order enjoining Google 
from intercepting and cataloging the content of Class members’ emails in violation of CIPA; 
(4) injunctive relief in the form of, inter alia, an order requiring Google to purge all 
information gathered from the interception of the content of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ 
messages in violation of ECPA and/or CIPA;  and (5) attorney’s fees and costs of litigation. 
7. Google has committed a breach of trust from which every facilitator of 
communications is prohibited: it acquired the substance of individuals’ communications 
without their consent. These acts are the twenty-first-century equivalent of AT&T 
eavesdropping on each of its customers’ phone conversations, or of the postal service taking 
information from private correspondence—acts that uniformly would be condemned as 
egregious and illegal invasions of privacy under any circumstance. As the California Supreme 
Court has said: 
[A] measure of personal isolation and personal control over the conditions of its 
abandonment is of the very essence of personal freedom and dignity…. A 
[person]…whose conversations may be overheard at the will of another…is less of a 
[person], has less human dignity, on that account. He who may intrude upon another at 
will is the master of the other and, in fact, intrusion is a primary weapon of the tyrant. 
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Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 231 (Cal. 1998) (citation omitted). 
II. THE PARTIES 
8. Plaintiff Daniel Matera resides in San Francisco, California. Plaintiff does not 
have and never has had an email account with Google. Plaintiff has sent emails to and received 
emails from Gmail users.  In so doing, Plaintiff’s emails were, without Plaintiff’s knowledge 
or consent, intercepted and scanned by Google for purposes of acquiring, interpreting, and 
cataloging the content of those electronic communications.  Although Plaintiff has never 
consented to having his emails intercepted and scanned by Google for the purpose of acquiring 
and cataloging their message content, and has never had any mechanism by which to opt out of 
such practices, he has continued to—and as a practical matter must continue to—communicate 
with Gmail users via email:  By virtue of the ubiquity of Gmail, and the fact that tens if not 
hundreds of millions of Gmail accounts are presently in existence, it is impossible for Plaintiff 
to avoid sending or receiving emails from Gmail users. 
9. Defendant Google, Inc. (“Google,” “Defendant,” or “the Company”) is a United 
States corporation headquartered in Mountain View, California, and incorporated under the 
laws of Delaware. 
III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
10. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has original jurisdiction over the 
claims of Plaintiff that arise under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
(“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. 
11. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant owns 
and operates a business that is headquartered in the Northern District of California and 
conducts substantial business throughout California. 
12. Venue properly lies in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), as 
Google, Inc. is headquartered in this district. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
13. Google is a California-based multinational corporation that offers web-based 
services, including, among others, the electronic communications service known as Gmail. 
14. In addition to providing Gmail, Google sells advertising services.   
15. Google products, including but not limited to Gmail, are embedded with data 
mining devices that track individual users’ behavior and report the information back to the 
Company.  Indeed, while Google initially declared that its collection of user data was 
maintained solely to make its services work better,3 the Company subsequently—and 
surreptitiously—began amalgamating user data from across its various platforms for ad 
targeting.4   
16. This strategy has enabled Google to become the dominant force in online 
advertising. Google’s user data enable it to deliver ads that are highly targeted to susceptible 
buyers.  It can thus sell more advertising and command higher prices.  Google’s revenues are 
almost entirely derived from ad sales, which accounted for 96% of its total revenue of $29.3 
billion in 2010; 96% of its total revenue of $37.9 billion 2011; 95% of its total revenue of $46 
billion in 2012, 91% of $56 billion in 2013, and 89% of $66 billion in 2014.5 
17. Google has developed products premised on interpersonal communication—
including Gmail—that have the attendant, undisclosed property of scanning and cataloging 
users’ communications to acquire and retain user data and deliver targeted advertisements 
based on these profiles. 
18. Google never obtained consent from Plaintiff or any Class member to scan and 
catalog the contents of his or her email communications with Gmail users. 
                                                 
3 Singel, Ryan. “Analysis: Google’s Ad Targeting Turns Algorithms on You,” Wired (Mar. 11, 
2009) (available at http://www.wired.com/business/2009/03/google-ad-annou/). 
4 Id. 
5 Google Form 10-K for fiscal year ending December 31, 2013, “Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations.” (available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000128877614000020/goog2013123110-
k.htm#sCF5BD61C9BB5908EEE622E71A9CC8F22); https://investor.google.com/financial/ 
tables.html.  
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Google’s Specific Content Extraction and Data Mining Procedures and Devices  
19. When Plaintiff and Class members sent emails to or received emails from 
Gmail users, Google intercepted these communications to scan, compile, analyze, and archive 
the contents of the communications.  Upon information and belief, Google employed a variety 
of devices—in the course of transmitting Plaintiff’s and Class members’ messages—to acquire 
and manipulate the content of said messages.  During the Relevant Time Period, such devices 
included, but were not limited to:   
 
• The Content Onebox process (“COB process”)—a distinct piece of Google’s 
infrastructure, the purpose of which is to acquire and interpret the content of users’ Gmail, 
including Plaintiff’s and Class members’ emails.  Through the COB process, during the 
Relevant Time Period, Google not only collected the content of said messages, but also 
created metadata about that content. 
 
• Changeling—a distinct piece of Google’s infrastructure that the Company used to acquire 
and interpret the contents of users’ Gmail, including Plaintiff’s and Class members’ 
emails. 
 
20. Upon information and belief, after extracting the content of Plaintiff’s and Class 
members’ messages and creating new, derivative data (“metadata”) therefrom, Google utilized 
a process called “Nemo,” whereby it determined how best to monetize the data gathered.  
21. In addition to using the intercepted content of Gmail to sell advertisements, 
Google also cataloged the intercepted content, including the emails of Plaintiff and Class 
members, to create user profiles to be stored indefinitely. The future purposes of this 
indefinitely stored information are unclear and have not been disclosed.  
22. Among other devices, Google utilized “PHIL,” or the Probabilistic Hierarchical 
Inferential Learner, a distinct piece of Google’s infrastructure the purpose of which is to learn 
the “meaning behind text” of the content of Gmail and the Plaintiff’s and Class members’ 
emails, by learning the relationships between words and concepts present in the acquired data.     
23. Upon information and belief, PHIL’s purpose is to process the data gathered 
from the intercepted messages’ content to create “PHIL clusters,” which amount to the inferred 
meaning of particular words or phrases derived by reading and acquiring the content of the 
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user’s emails.  Through PHIL clusters, Google learns “concepts” by learning an explanatory 
model of text.  As such, PHIL’s concepts are intended to and (on information and belief) do 
model the actual ideas passing through a person’s mind before the person composes the text 
that is read and acquired by Google.  
Google Did Not Obtain the Consent of Plaintiff or Class members to Scan and Catalog the 
Contents of Their Emails 
24. At all relevant times, Google indiscriminately intercepted, scanned, and 
cataloged all emails sent or received by its Gmail accountholders.  Google had no policy of 
limiting this practice only to email between Gmail users.  So, whenever Plaintiff and Class 
members exchanged emails with Gmail users, the contents of those private communications 
were scanned and cataloged by Google. 
25. At all relevant times, Google had no policy in place to obtain the consent of 
non-Gmail users to having their emails scanned and cataloged, in the course of exchanging 
emails with Gmail users.  Neither did Google have a policy in place during the relevant 
timeframe to put Plaintiff or Class members on notice that their private correspondence with 
Gmail users was being and would be scanned, cataloged, analyzed, and used, inter alia, to sell 
and deliver targeted. Google did not notify or even attempt to notify Plaintiff or the Class 
members of any of those facts, or in any way seek to obtain their consent to any of these acts.  
Nor did Google have a process in place to exclude non-Gmail users’ emails from its scanning 
and cataloging practices. 
26. Before December 19, 2014, Google’s Gmail Terms of Service and Privacy 
Policy made no mention of the practices complained of herein, and thus Google failed to 
legally obtain the consent of Gmail users to the practices complained of herein.  See In re 
Google Inc. Gmail Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172784 at *50 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) 
(“The Court finds that Gmail users' acceptance of [Google’s Terms of Service and Privacy 
Policy] does not establish explicit consent.”) 
27. On or about December 19, 2014, Google amended its Privacy Policy to read, in 
relevant part: “Our automated systems analyze your content (including emails) to provide you 
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personally relevant product features, such as customized search results, tailored advertising, 
and spam and malware detection.”  Plaintiff and the Class Members were never subject to or 
on notice of Google’s Privacy Policy, either before or after its amendment.  Plaintiff and the 
Class Members never clicked on or otherwise accepted Google’s Privacy Policy—which is 
buried in a supplement to a click-through agreement on a website.  Google does not legally or 
conscionably obtain user’s consent to its Privacy Policy, either before or after its amendment. 
 
Google’s Conduct Falls Outside the Only Possible Exception to the Statutes Prohibiting Its 
Conduct—None of the Actions Complained of Herein Fall Within the Ordinary Course of 
Google’s Email Provider Business  
28. Google’s interception of Gmail, including the emails of Plaintiff and the Class 
members, as alleged herein, were not conducted in the ordinary course of its business, within 
the meaning of CIPA or ECPA.  Google cannot demonstrate the interception facilitated the 
communication service or was incidental to the functioning of the provided communication 
service.  There is no nexus between Google’s interception of Gmail and its subscriber's 
ultimate business, that is, the ability of Google to provide the underlying service or good.  
Instead Google intercepts Gmail for the distinct purpose of acquiring and retaining user data 
and creating targeted advertising, and therefore the interception is outside the ordinary course 
of Google’s business.  Google Inc. Gmail Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172784, *30 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 26, 2013); Campbell v. Facebook Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177331, *21 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 23, 2014). 
Plaintiff and Class Members Are at Continued Risk of the Injuries Alleged Herein 
29. Plaintiff is constrained to communicate with Gmail users through those users’ 
Gmail accounts, given the ubiquity of Gmail.  Plaintiff cannot reasonably avoid sending emails 
to or receiving emails from Gmail users. 
30. Google has changed the language in its privacy policy 3 times in 2015, alone, 
and 8 times since January 1, 2013.  Google has come under criticism for aggregating its 
privacy policy across platforms and products (i.e., making a one-size-fits-all policy to govern 
YouTube, Gmail, Google+, etc.).  Google is free to amend its Privacy Policy in the future, 
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eliminating all reference to its scanning practices—which Plaintiff contends are, at present, 
still too oblique to establish express consent on the part of Gmail users to the scanning 
practices described herein. 
31. Google has, in the past, made affirmative representations that it would not 
acquire or catalog message content on certain of its email platforms, only to be caught 
subsequently engaging in the precise activities it had publicly disclaimed.6  Accordingly, 
absent an order from this Court enjoining Google from such practices, Plaintiff and Class 
members are and will remain at risk of Google unilaterally dispensing with the privacy rights 
guaranteed by the laws of California and the United States. 
V. CLASS ALLEGATIONS 
32. Plaintiff brings this class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedures, individually and on behalf of all members of the following classes, which are 
jointly referred to throughout this Complaint as the Class: 
 
CIPA Class (Count One): All persons in the State of California 
who have never established an email account with Google, and who 
have sent emails to or received emails from individuals with 
Google email accounts. 
 
ECPA Class (Count Two): All persons in the United States who 
have never established an email account with Google, and who sent 
emails to or received emails from individuals with Google email 
accounts before December 19, 2014. 
 
33. Excluded from each of the Classes are the following individuals and/or entities: 
Google and its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, and any entity in which 
Google has a controlling interest; any and all federal, state or local governments, including but 
not limited to their department, agencies, divisions, bureaus, boards, sections, groups, counsels 
and/or subdivisions; and all judges assigned to hear any aspect of this litigation, as well as their 
immediate family members. 
                                                 
6 http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/04/30/google-stops-scanning-student-gmail-accounts-for-ads/ 
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34. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definition of each of the 
proposed Classes before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate. 
35. This action readily satisfies the requirements set forth under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23: 
Class Action Allegations 
36. Each Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.  Upon 
information and belief, Class members number in the millions. 
37. There are questions of law or fact common to the Classes.  These questions 
include, but are not limited to, the following: 
a. Whether Google’s acts and practices complained of herein amount to an 
intentional and unauthorized connection to an electronic communication, in violation of Cal. 
Pen. Code § 631(a) (on behalf of the CIPA Class);  
b. Whether Google’s acts and practices complained of herein amount to the 
willful and unauthorized reading, attempting to read, or learning the contents or meaning of 
Plaintiff’s and Class members’ in transit communications, in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 
631(a) (on behalf of the CIPA Class); 
c. Whether Google used or attempted to use any information acquired in 
violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 631(a) (on behalf of the CIPA Class);  
d. Whether Google intentionally intercepted, endeavored to intercept, or 
procured any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept Plaintiff’s and Class members’ 
electronic communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (on behalf of the ECPA 
Class); 
e. Whether Google acquired any “contents” of Plaintiff’s and Class 
members’ electronic communications, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (on behalf of 
the ECPA Class); 
f. Whether Plaintiff’s and Class members’ emails were “electronic 
communications” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (on behalf of the ECPA Class); 
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g. Whether Google used an “electronic, mechanical, or other device,” 
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (on behalf of the ECPA Class); 
h. Whether Google intentionally used, or endeavored to use, the contents 
of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ electronic communications, knowing or having reason to 
know that the information was obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (on behalf of 
the ECPA Class); 
i. Whether Google acted intentionally in violating privacy rights; 
j. Whether an injunction should issue; and 
k. Whether declaratory relief should be granted. 
38.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class of non-Gmail users in 
that Plaintiff and the Classes sent emails to and received emails from Gmail users.  In the 
process, Google intercepted, scanned, and acquired the content of those electronic 
communications.  Google further used or endeavored to use the contents of Plaintiff’s and 
Class members’ electronic communications.  Plaintiff and the Class members did not consent 
to the interception and use of their electronic communications, which acts form the basis for 
this suit.  Moreover, like all Class members, Plaintiff suffers a substantial risk of repeated 
injury in the future.  Like all Class members, although Plaintiff has never consented to having 
his emails intercepted and scanned by Google for the purpose of acquiring and cataloging their 
message content, and has never had any mechanism by which to opt-out of such practices, he 
has continued to—and must continue to—communicate with Gmail users via email.  Indeed, 
by virtue of the ubiquity of Gmail in its various incarnations7, and the fact that tens if not 
hundreds of millions of Gmail accounts presently exist, Plaintiff and Class members cannot 
avoid sending emails to or receiving emails from Gmail users now and in the future.  Plaintiff 
and the Class members are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief as a result of the 
conduct complained of herein.  Because the conduct complained of herein is systemic, Plaintiff 
and all Class Members face substantial risk of the same injury in the future.  Google’s conduct 
                                                 
7 See footnote 1, infra. 
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is common to all Class members and represents a common thread of conduct resulting in injury 
to all members of the Class.  Plaintiff has suffered the harm alleged and has no interests 
antagonistic to any other Class member. 
39. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes.  
Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class members.  Furthermore, 
Plaintiff has retained competent counsel experienced in class action litigation, consumer 
protection litigation, and electronic privacy litigation.  Plaintiff’s counsel will fairly and 
adequately protect and represent the interests of the Classes.  FRCP 23(a)(4) and 23(g) are 
satisfied. 
40. In acting as above-alleged, and in failing and refusing to cease and desist 
despite public outcry and the initiation of lawsuits, Google has acted on grounds generally 
applicable to the entire Classes, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding 
declaratory relief each appropriate with respect to the Classes as a whole.  The prosecution of 
separate actions by individual Class members would create the risk of inconsistent or varying 
adjudications with respect to individual Class members that would establish incompatible 
standards of conduct for Google and other email providers. 
41. Injunctive relief is necessary to prevent further unlawful and unfair conduct by 
Google.  Money damages, alone, could not afford adequate and complete relief, and injunctive 
relief is necessary to restrain Google from continuing to commit its illegal and unfair violations 
of privacy.  As discussed in paragraphs 29-31, infra, Defendant routinely has altered the terms 
of its Privacy Policy, conflated the application of its contract with its customers across 
platforms, and acted contrary to its public-facing representations.  
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VI. CAUSES OF ACTION 
COUNT ONE 
(Violations of CIPA, Cal. Pen. Code §§ 630, et seq.) 
(Brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and the CIPA Class) 
42. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this complaint as if repeated 
here. 
43. Cal. Pen. Code § 630 provides that “[t]he Legislature hereby declares that 
advances in science and technology have led to the development of new devices and 
techniques for the purpose of eavesdropping upon private communication and that the invasion 
of privacy resulting from the continual and increasing use of such devices and techniques has 
created a serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties and cannot be tolerated in a 
free and civilized society.” 
44. Cal. Pen. Code § 631(a) prohibits the use of “any machine, instrument, or 
contrivance, or...any other manner” to  “intentionally tap[], or make[] any unauthorized 
connection, whether physically, electrically, acoustically, inductively, or otherwise, with any 
telegraph or telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument” or to “willfully and without the consent 
of all parties to the communication, or in any unauthorized manner, read[], or attempt[] to read, 
or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, report, or communication while the same 
is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or received at any 
place within this state.”   
45. Cal. Pen. Code § 631(a) further prohibits the “use[], or attempt[] to use, in any 
manner, or for any purpose, or to communicate in any way, any information so obtained.” 
46. Google’s acts and practices complained of herein, engaged in for purposes of 
acquiring and using the content of emails sent to and from Plaintiff and Class members to 
generate significant advertising profits, violated and violate Cal. Pen. Code § 631. 
47. Google committed the acts and practices complained of herein knowingly and 
willfully, spending significant sums and using cutting-edge technology to do so in the most 
comprehensive and effective manner possible.  Google’s actions were at all relevant times 
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intentional as evidenced by, inter alia, the design of its data flow processes, its utilization of 
message-scanning devices, its utilization of devices to divine the meaning of the content of 
private messages and to discern the communicants’ likely thoughts before writing them, and 
Google’s use of that information for, inter alia, data profiling and ad targeting. 
48. Google was not a party to the emails sent or received by Plaintiff and Class 
members at any point during the relevant time period. 
49. Google engaged in the acts complained of herein without the consent of 
Plaintiff and Class members. 
50. Each email sent to and from Plaintiff and Class members, and scanned and 
cataloged by Google, was a “message, report, or communication” within the meaning of Cal. 
Pen. Code § 631. 
51. Each email sent to or from Plaintiff or to or from any Class member, and 
scanned and cataloged by Google, was “in transit” within the meaning of Cal. Pen. Code § 
631. 
52. Each of the actions taken by Google and complained of herein extends beyond 
the normal occurrences, requirements, and expectations regarding the facilitation and 
transmission of private messages. 
53. Pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 7, Google, a corporation, is a “person.” 
54. As a result of Google’s violations of Cal. Pen. Code § 631, and pursuant to Cal. 
Pen. Code § 637.2, Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to the following relief: 
a. A declaration that Google’s conduct violates CIPA; 
b. Injunctive relief in the form of, inter alia, an order enjoining Google 
from continuing its practice of intercepting the content of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ 
emails in violation of CIPA;  
c. Injunctive relief in the form of, inter alia, an order requiring Google to 
destroy all data created or otherwise obtained from its illegal interception of emails sent or 
received by Plaintiff or any Class member; and 
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d. An award of attorney’s fees and costs of litigation as provided by CIPA, 
the private attorney general doctrine existing at common law and also codified at California 
Civil Code Section 1021.5, and all other applicable laws; 
55. In addition, pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 637.2, Plaintiff individually seeks 
monetary damages in the amount of $5,000, as well as trebled actual damages, in an amount to 
be proved at trial. 
56. While certain devices and methods have been identified in this Complaint, 
Plaintiff reserves the right to assert CIPA violations as to any further devices subsequently 
disclosed or discovered. 
COUNT TWO 
(Violations of ECPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et seq.) 
(Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the ECPA Class) 
57. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this complaint as if repeated 
here. 
58. Google’s actions alleged herein, and each of them, have at all times affected 
interstate commerce.  Upon information and belief, Google mail has more than 425 million 
users worldwide. 
59. Google, a corporation, is a “person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6). 
60. The email communications transmitted by Plaintiff and the Class members, and 
each of them, were and have been at all relevant times “electronic communications,” pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11). 
61. Google engaged in the acts complained of herein without the consent of 
Plaintiff or the Class members. 
62. Google engaged in the acts complained of herein without the consent of Gmail 
users. 
63. Google’s actions were at all relevant times intentional as evidenced by, inter 
alia, the design of its data flow processes, its utilization of message-scanning devices, its 
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utilization of devices to divine the meaning of the content of private messages and to discern 
the communicants’ likely thoughts before writing them, and Google’s use of that information 
for, inter alia, data profiling and ad targeting. 
64. Google used one or more “devices,” as defined pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5), 
to intercept the electronic communications transmitted to Google mail users by Plaintiff and 
the Class members, and each of them. Such devices include, but are not limited to, the distinct 
pieces of Google infrastructure comprising the COB process, Changeling, the “Nemo” process, 
and PHIL. 
65. The devices were not used by Google, operating as an electronic 
communication service, in the ordinary course of providing electronic communication services.  
Specifically, Google’s interception of electronic communications sent by and to Plaintiff and 
the Class members, and each of them was, among other things, (a) for undisclosed purposes; 
(b) for purposes of acquiring, cataloging and retaining user data; (c) for purposes beyond 
facilitating the transmission of emails sent or received by either Gmail users or Plaintiff and 
the Class members; (f) contrary to Google’s public statements; (g) in violation of federal law; 
and (h) in violation of the property rights of Plaintiff and Class members in their private 
information. These activities are not within the ordinary course of business of a provider of an 
electronic communication service. 
66. The conduct alleged herein did not occur after the electronic communications 
had been transmitted and were in storage. Rather, Google transferred, transmitted, or routed 
each communication to each of its self-serving devices to acquire and learn private information 
about Plaintiff and the Class members from their emails in the course of those emails’ 
transmission. 
67. Google’s conduct complained of herein also violated 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(d), 
which prohibits the intentional use or endeavoring to make use of “contents of any wire, oral, 
or electronic communication,” when such contents were acquired in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2511(1)(a). 
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68. As a result of Google’s violations of § 2511, and pursuant to § 2520, Plaintiff 
seeks the following relief for himself and the Class: 
a. A declaration that Google’s conduct prior to December 19, 2014 
violated ECPA. 
b. Injunctive relief in the form of, inter alia, an order enjoining Google 
from intercepting the content of Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ emails in violation of 
ECPA in the future; 
c. Injunctive relief in the form of, inter alia, an order requiring Google to 
destroy all data created or otherwise obtained from the interception of emails sent or received 
by Plaintiff and Class members, or any of them, before December 19, 2014; and 
d. Attorney’s fees and costs of litigation as provided by ECPA. 
69. In addition, pursuant to § 2520, Plaintiff individually seeks the greater of (1) the 
sum of actual damages sustained by Plaintiff and any profits made by Google as a result if its 
ECPA violations complained of herein or (2) statutory damages of the greater of (a) $100 a day 
for each day of violation or (b) $10,000.  
70. While certain devices have been identified in this Complaint, Plaintiff reserves 
the right to assert ECPA violations as to any further devices subsequently disclosed or 
discovered. 
VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that judgment be entered against Defendant and that the 
Court grant the following: 
A. An order determining that this action may be maintained as a class action under 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that Plaintiff is a proper class 
representative, appointing Plaintiff’s attorneys as Class counsel pursuant to 
Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and providing that Class 
notice be promptly issued; 
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B. Judgment against Google for Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ asserted causes of 
action; 
C. Appropriate declaratory relief against Google; 
D. Injunctive relief in the form of, inter alia, an order enjoining Google from 
continuing its practice of intercepting the content of Plaintiff’s and Class 
members’ emails in violation of CIPA and ECPA; 
E. Injunctive relief related to CIPA in the form of, inter alia, an order requiring 
Google to destroy all data acquired, created or otherwise obtained from the 
interception of emails sent or received by Plaintiff and Class members; 
F. Injunctive relief related to ECPA class in the form of, inter alia, an order 
requiring Google to destroy all data created or otherwise obtained from the 
interception of emails sent or received by Plaintiff and Class members prior to 
December 19, 2014;  
G. An award of damages to Plaintiff pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 637.2;  
H. An award of damages to Plaintiff pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2520;  
I. Reasonable attorney’s fees and costs reasonably incurred; and 
J. Any and all other and further relief to which Plaintiff and the Class may be 
entitled. 
 
 
 
Dated: September 4, 2015 
 
Respectfully Submitted,
 
/s/ Michael W. Sobol
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 Michael W. Sobol (State Bar No. 194857)
msobol@lchb.com 
Nicole D. Sugnet (SBN 246255) 
nsugnet@lchb.com 
LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP 
275 Battery Street, 29th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94111-3339 
Telephone:  415.956.1000 
Facsimile:  415.956.1008 
 
Hank Bates (State Bar No. 167688) 
CARNEY BATES & PULLIAM, PLLC 
2800 Cantrell Road, Suite 510  
Little Rock, AR 72202 
Telephone:  501.312.8500 
Facsimile:  501.312.8505 
 
Ray E. Gallo (State Bar No. 158903) 
rgallo@gallo-law.com 
Dominic Valerian (State Bar No. 240001) 
dvalerian@gallo-law.com 
GALLO LLP 
1299 Fourth St., Suite 505 
San Rafael, CA 94901 
Phone: 415.257.8800 
 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury of all issues so triable. 
 
Dated: September 4, 2015 
 
Respectfully Submitted,
 
/s/ Michael W. Sobol
 
 Michael W. Sobol (State Bar No. 194857)
msobol@lchb.com 
Nicole D. Sugnet (SBN 246255) 
nsugnet@lchb.com 
LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP 
275 Battery Street, 29th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94111-3339 
Telephone:  415.956.1000 
Facsimile:  415.956.1008 
 
Hank Bates (State Bar No. 167688) 
CARNEY BATES & PULLIAM, PLLC 
2800 Cantrell Road, Suite 510  
Little Rock, AR 72202 
Telephone:  501.312.8500 
Facsimile:  501.312.8505 
 
Ray E. Gallo (State Bar No. 158903) 
rgallo@gallo-law.com 
Dominic Valerian (State Bar No. 240001) 
dvalerian@gallo-law.com 
GALLO LLP 
1299 Fourth St., Suite 505 
San Rafael, CA 94901 
Phone: 415.257.8800 
 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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